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Guido Calabresi* THE PROBLEM OF MALPRACTICE:
TRYING TO ROUND OUT THE CIRCLEt
The problem of medical malpractice is difficult only if one believes that
liability rules are important tools for achieving what I have elsewhere called
primary accident cost reduction - that is, the minimization of the sum of
medical accident costs and medical safety costs. I In the medical context this
'economic efficiency' motive is no different from the knotty problem of
'achieving the highest quality of medical care' where (if we are not to be silly
or fatuous) highest quality implies 'considering the price.'
I have not said that the desire to reduce the sum of medical accident and
medical accident avoidance costs lJy itself makes medical malpractice a
difficult problem. If one believes that collective, regulatory approaches
suffice to limit medical maloccurrences to those, and only those, which
would be too costly to avoid, then medical malpractice as we know it today, or
generally discuss it in reform proposals, becomes unimportant. If gov-
ernmental rules or peer group controls, roughly akin to building codes - I
believe they are called professional standards review organizations (PSROS) in
the United States - can determine what medical care is worthwhile - and to
be mandated - and what is noxious or simply too costly - and to be pro-
scribed (I exaggerate the ideological purity of the approach, of course) -
then efficient medical care can be achieved without the dubious benefits of
torts law, and one need not discuss the issue further. 2
Similarly, though conversely, medical malpractice has no role to play if
one believes that negotiations as to appropriate treatment occur between
* John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
t This paper is a slightly revised version of the C.A. Wright Memorial Lecture delivered at
the University of Toronto on 9 February 1977. A preliminary version of the paper was
presented for discussion at the American Enterprise Institute Conference on the
Economics of Medical Malpractice held in Washington, DC on 15-16 December 1976. The
American Enterprise Institute will publish the paper as part ofa collection of papers there
presented, together with the discussions which followed.
I For a definition ofliability rules see, Calabresi and Melamed, Property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability: One view of the cathedral, (1972),58 Harvard L.R. 1089-128; 'Primary
accident cost reduction' is defined and analyzed in Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents (1970).
2 PSROS were authorized by Congress in 1972 to monitor the appropriateness of health
services financed by Medicare, Medicaid, and other health programs. U.S. Congress,
House of Representatives, Social Security Amendments of I972, Pub. Law 92-603, 92d
Congress, 2d Session, 1972, H.R. I. For a recent review of quality assessment programs in
medical care, including PSROS, see, Institute ofMedicine, Assessing Quality in Health Care: An
Evaluation, Final Report (1976).
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doctors and patients with sufficient parity of knowledge of risks. In such a
case also, torts law is not needed because patients will choose those and just
those treatments whose risks and costs they desire, and just those doctors
whose abilities, for the price, they find optimal.3
The first non-tort law approach to achieving optimal quality of medical
care that I described is a parody of a collective ideologue's search for
utilitarian efficiency in medical care. That this regulatory or criminal law
model is not infrequently suggested will frighten some and amuse others,
but, from my point ofview, what is important is that most thoughtful people
are likely, soon, to recognize that it is not very promising as an effective way
of assuring optimal medical care. It can work to control extreme abuses - the
butcher can be deterred, the obviously unnecessary treatment can be for-
bidden. But this approach, which is so rigid that it fails even in relatively
stable technological areas (like the building trades), is apt to be a very poor
guide indeed when the issue (of what care is worth risking) changes as
rapidly as modern medicine.
The second non-tort law approach that I mentioned is a parody of the
market ideologue's dream of utilitarian efficiency in medical care. This
contractual model, at first glance, seems particularly appealing because here
those transaction costs, which frequently make the pure market a poor road
to an utilitarian's heaven, seem absent. The victim does not, as in auto-
pedestrian cases, have to seek out every possible injurer and bribe him to
employ better brakes - he is staring at his potential injurer across the
examining room. Unfortunately, parity of knowledge of risks is needed for
contractual arrangements to lead to Professor Coase's optimum,4 and the
cost of giving that knowledge may come very high indeed. It is not only costly
to enforce rules designed to give parity ofknowledge, that is, to make patient
consent be 'informed,' but, more important, parity of knowledge and in-
formed consent frequently entail significant costs of making people know
things they do not wish to know. This fact makes the medical malpractice
problem far more complicated than the analogous problem of knowledge in
other contractual situations. Extreme cases of bad treatment and bad doc-
tors may well be controlled ultimately by the unfettered market - but those
cases could also be controlled by regulation and are not the key to our
problem. As a result, as many despair of the contractual approach to optimal
medical care as do of the regulatory-criminal law approach.
All that I have so far said, however, is in no way unique to medical
3 Cf, Epstein, Medical malpractice: The case for contract, (1976), 1 American Bar Foundation
Research J., 96-107. For a very different contractual approach, one that assumes medical
malpractice law as a starting point but allows persons to contract out of that, fault-based,
liability by electing a system of no-fault liability and compensation, see, O'Connell, An
elective no-fault liability statute, (1975), 628 Insurance L.J., 261-93.
4 For the classic description of how contractual approaches can, in the absence of transaction
costs, lead to efficiency, see, Coase, The problem of social cost, (1960), 3 J. Law and
Economics, 1-44.
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malpractice. It applies as well to most areas where safety costs must be traded
off against accident costs. In those areas too, regulation or criminal law are
occasionally deemed effective and employed while at other times contractual
negotiations are allowed to establish the desired level of safety. The major
difference between those areas and medical malpractice is the fact that in
those areas the tort law approach - whatever its flaws, and be it fault or
non-fault based - seems to be a reasonably effective supplement when
regulation and contract do not suffice to minimize the sum of accident and
safety costs. What is so troublesome about medical malpractice, instead, is
that neither the fault-based approach, which so far has been dominant, nor
any proposed non-fault substitutes has seemed to be a satisfactory means of
medical care assurance in that - apparently - broad set of situations in which
neither regulation nor contract seems likely to work. 5
It may, of course, be the case that our society is not interested in reducing
the sum of medical maloccurrence costs and the costs of avoiding them, or-
what is the same thing - that the cost ofany system which would do so beyond
what can be done by regulation and contract is so high as not to be worth
undertaking. It may even be the case that the fuss about malpractice has little
to do with the quality of medical care at all. It could, instead, have to do with a
desire to compel spreading of the costs of certain catastrophic medical
maloccurrences. Or, it could have to do with a desire to remove the cost of
such maloccurrences (whether spread or not) from victims and doctors and
have them be borne - for purely wealth distributional reasons - by taxpayers
at large. Ifeither of these goals is what we are seeking (and in part they surely
are), then, once again, the malpractice problem becomes relatively simple.
Those losses which we would have spread, we will require people to insure
against; the premiums can be borne by patients and by doctors - if, like good
monopolists, doctors are already charging the most the traffic will bear6 ; or
they can be removed and paid out of the general fisc - that is, assessed to
whomever, for wealth distributional reasons, the society wishes to assess. If
they are removed, of course, all financial incentives for optimal quality of
medical care are also removed but, by the hypothesis that I made, the society
5 Cf, Keeton, Compensation for medical accidents, (1973),121 U. PcnnaL.R., 590-617. The
matter is more complicated than the text suggests. All approaches, regulatory, contractual,
and mixed (like torts law), get overburdened. Regulation may work well in any given
context, and yet fail if that context is the last of a long list of areas which we are trying to
regulate. The knowledge needed for a contractual approach to work well may be made
available at reasonable costs in a limited number of contexts and yet be impossible, or
prohibitively expensive, if one tries to make it available in all contexts. Similarly, the tort
law approach may be able to handle adequately some problems (perhaps even malprac-
tice), if these were the only problems it had to handle, and fail miserably if the same
problems were part of a much larger set assigned to it. In such situations, decisions based
on the comparative advantage of using one approach as against another become crucial.
Thus the fact that torts might do a slightly better job than 'pure contract,' for instance,
would not suffice tojustify the use ofa torts approach ifsuch use made torts less effective in
other areas where its advantage over contractual methods was greater.
6 Cf, Kessel, Price discrimination in medicine, (1958), 1j. Law and Economics, 20-53.
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would not care or could achieve what it sought by other means, like regula-
tion.
Unfortunately, however, I am not convinced that we can so readily ignore
the possibility that financial incentives established through allocation of
liability for medical maloccurrence are important to the achievement of that
level of medical care our society desires. It may be that after considering the
miserable job that current malpractice law does in this regard, and after
examining the difficulties with possible reforms, we are reduced to saying:
let us rely on the internal pressures for good care that the profession
develops, let us deal with extreme cases through regulation or criminal law,
or through the kind of pressures which the contractual approach (that is,
patient-doctor negotiations) will give despite limited and unequal know-
ledge, let us spread losses or redistribute burdens to our (ideological) heart's
desire and let us accept that, since we can do no better, what we have (without
more complicated financial incentives) is efficient, indeed optimal, even if
pretty dreadful. 7 It may be, yet we cannot begin with that gloomy conclusion.
II
I cannot in this paper spend much time on the problems, real and fancied,
with the existing system of malpractice law. The theory of that branch of law
is simple enough and not even totally unsound; the reasons it does not work
adequately are real and have been written about quite sufficiently. Like most
fault-based approaches to liability, medical malpractice begins with the
assumption that the costs of any medical malocturrences which cannot be
judged, by a jury, court, administrative agency, or legislature, to be worth
avoiding, should lie on the victim. If, instead, a governmental agency of the
kind just listed is prepared to say that the cost of avoiding the maloccurrence
is less than the cost of the untoward event discounted by its risk, and that the
doctor should have known this, then the doctor is at fault and must pay for
the maloccurrence. In theory the same fault approach would charge doctors
with unnecessary avoidance costs: costs the doctors should have known were
not worth the maloccurrences they avoided. Such unnecessary avoidance
costs are just as much at fault, in a technical sense, and ought, from an
efficiency point of view though not from a spreading point of view, to be
deemed malpractice.
That in the malpractice area the governmental-utilitarian, or cost-benefit,
analysis just described has been influenced (to an extent unknown in other
areas) by the custom of the trade (medical practice as shown by expert
testimony) is not crucial, since if that aspect is considered undesirable it
could with relative ease be cured. Similarly, one need not worry unduly
about the fact that this traditional approach leaves on the hapless victim all
7 cr, Epstein, supra note 3.
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the medical maloccurrence losses which are not deemed worth avoiding.
One need not worry about that since, if we wish, insurance against such, or
some particularly catastrophic set of such, losses could be required, and the
burden of the losses could thereby be spread among all users, or even
removed to distributionally preferred payors. All this could be done without
substantially altering the incentive element on doctors to avoid those andjust
those medical maloccurrences the governmental agency deems, after the
fact, to have been worth avoiding before the fact. (Spreading or removing of
losses from victims might, in theory, reduce victim care. But the notion that
these losses - by hypothesis deemed not worth avoidance by doctors - are
subject to significant reduction through victim care, seems, to me at least,
most unlikely.)
Similarly, the basic problem with fault-based malpractice as a vehicle for
assuring optimal quality of medical care does not lie in the very real in-
adequacies of the insurance market. It may well be true that (since the law in
this area is changing rapidly [and here I am speaking mainly of the United
States, ofcourse], though perhaps not more rapidly than tort law generally-
and since malpractice cases do not get decided until many years after the
alleged tort) insurance companies are incapable ofapproximating the actua-
rial risk they undertake in insuring doctors against distant future losses
arising out of today's events. Because insurance companies cannot be sure
that they can charge future generations of doctors high enough premiums
to cover old liabilities which are just coming tojudgment (new entrants in the
insurance market could undersell old companies in insuring such future
doctors since these new insurers would not bear the liability backlog), pres-
ent insurance rates tend to be 'gambling' rather than actuarial rates. They
are designed to cover an unknown future risk. Insurance companies, being
more averse to risk than almost anyone - they are by specialization actuaries
not entrepreneurs - are most unwilling to take on a gamble. This leads to few
insurers and rates, among those few, which may, in retrospect, turn out to be
. exorbitant but which cannot ex ante be shown to be wrong.s The rate of
return demanded for bearing an entrepreneur's risk - true profit, F.H.
Knight called it- has always been high, even when sought by those less averse
to risk than insurance companies. Still, this problem could be alleviated by
systems designed to assure insurers that they will be able to compel future
generations of doctors to bear a share of the past risk backlog. Indeed, that is
what reforms like 'medical association' malpractice insurance often come
down to (if the medical society believes it will be able to compel future
doctors to insure with it, it need not worry if current rates turn out to be
inadequate to cover future suits and can compute those rates without a
'gambling' premium). Or the problem can be alleviated by government
intervention. The government can 'insure' against the entrepreneurial risk,
8 Cf, Roddis and Stewart, The insurance of medical losses, (1975), Duke L.J.. 1281-303.
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much as it 'insured' long-term low-deposit mortgages after World War II in
the United States. If the entrepreneurial risk turns out to have been low (as
in the post-war mortgage market), the government will have simply been an
insurer. If instead the risk turns out to have been higher than the premiums
charged could cover, then, in retrospect, the government will have sub-
sidized medical care by its intervention. Either way, the problem would have
been dealt with.
No, the basic problems in fault based malpractice law do not lie in these
real but on the whole correctible problems. Nor do they lie in that much
maligned, but nevertheless admirable, lawyer's fee mutual-insurance
scheme that we call the contingent-fee system. They stem, rather, from the
fact that we have little or no faith in courts, juries, administrative agencies,
and even peer-group tribunals when they purport to tell us which medical
maloccurrences are worth avoiding, which are not, and, perhaps more
important, which maloccurrence-avoidance costs are too expensive and
should be avoided. I again except the easy cases of butchery, because those,
as I have said, probably can be dealt with adequately under any approach.
Short of those cases, however, we have virtually no assurance that the
administratively highly expensive, stigma spewing, approach we use creates
those incentives to good medical care which, ultimately, can be its only
reason for being. And if it does not, then we would be justified, it would
seem, in abandoning it, and substituting for it whatever systems would give
us the spreading or wealth distribution allocation of burdens we desire, and
forget about incentives.
Why does not the fault-based system give us the incentives which are
needed to justify it? In theory, as I said, there is no reason why it should not.
As a practical matter, however, it is clear that the governmental or peer-
group decision maker will consistently find only certain categories of mal-
occurrences to be avoidable. In almost every instance, for every treatment
which, if it goes wrong as sometimes it will, gives rise to a compensable loss,
there exists a substitute treatment or non-treatment whose harm in practice
would not be recognized as a compensable loss. This problem in the
decision-makers is compounded by the fact that the victim is equally 'biased'
in what he or she can recognize as a cost which can give rise to compensation.
In other words, almost inevitably, the fault-malpractice system penalizes
some medical maloccurrences and some avoidance costs while systematically
failing to penalize the medical maloccurrence and avoidance costs of substi-
tute approaches. One need not be an economist to realize that any approach
which so biases incentives is unlikely to lead to an efficient result. Defensive
medicine is an apt term for what unfortunately is only the tip of this iceberg.
Unless we can round out the circle and create roughly equivalent incentives
for avoiding medical maloccurrence costs and safety costs in substitute forms
of treatment and non-treatment, we will not do what alone can justify the
existence of this cumbersome and expensive area of the law. But if the
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unsolved problem of creating unbiased incentives is the source of our
fundamental dissatisfaction with existing malpractice law, it equally bedevils
proposals for its reform, to which I must now turn.
III
The most promising attempt at reform, I think, is that tried by Havighurst
and Tancredi.9 They recognize the need to establish incentives to good
medical care for treatment and non-treatment alike, as well as for substitute
forms of treatment. Their solution is to select areas of medical care in which
all significant maloccurrence costs of substitute treatments either can be
compensated for on a non-fault basis, or can be prevented by regulation.
That is, if non-treatment in a particular circumstance is so grotesque as to be
readily proscribed (or even without proscription, will be avoided by doctors
regardless of complex financial incentives) - say, a failure to operate or to
use anesthesia in the operation - then that non-treatment need not be
worried about in establishing an incentive scheme for medical care. It is not a
meaningful substitute. This fact permits us to charge - on a non-fault basis-
for any harm arising out of the inevitable operation and anesthesia, thereby
creating appropriate incentives for choosing among all meaningful substi-
tutes.
Unfortunately, the number of situations in which such a circle of possible
substitute treatments is either complete or can satisfactorily be completed
by regulation is quite limited. Much remains out of Havighurst's and Tan-
credi's control. More important, their approach tends to create a series of
border situations where victim compensation depends on whether the injury
occurred within the scheme or without. Whenever that is the case adminis-
trative costs multiply, because the victims have a strong incentive to describe
the facts so that they fall within the scheme, and the injurers have the
opposite incentive. One major source of the high cost of workmen's compen-
sation plans in the United States is the litigation expense of fighting out the
often crucial issue of whether an injury arose 'out of and in the course of
employment,' and is covered by the scheme, or did not, and is covered by the
riskier (but occasionally more liberal) general law of torts. Unless we are
prepared to compensate victims to the same extent - whatever the source of
their injury: treatment, or non-treatment; if in one area of medicine, then in
all others (much as the Woodhouse approach did for all accidents in New
Zealand) - we will have created precisely the borderline costs which have so
bedevilled other reform schemes.
What would be a complete system of financial incentives to good medical
care? What would round out the circle so that on a non-fault basis the
9 Havighurst and Tancredi, Medical adversity insurance: A no-fault approach to medical
malpractice and quality assurance, (1974), 613 Insurance Lj., 69: Havighurst, 'Medical
adversity insurance': Has its time come?, (1975) Duke Lj., 1233-80
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appropriate incentives would operate and we would be free to abandon both
fault and regulatory approaches? It is not difficult to state such a complete
circle- in one context. But to state it is to suggest immediately the problems-
the costs, if you will- of rounding out the circle. Because of this and because
there are many other, equally flawed, ways of rounding out the circle, I do
not describe my complete circle as a proposed reform, but rather as a joke,' a
way of raising the question ofwhether it is worth pursuing any reform which
proposes to take seriously the goal of achieving optimal quality of medical
care through financial incentives.
Let us posit a system of health maintenance organizations (HMOS) with
sufficient competition among HMOS so that a substantial choice among them
exists for any consumer. 10 Let us posit also that the choice of HMO will be
made in the employment context through union-management negotiations,
so that costs of treatment and non-treatment become available as under-
standable statistics to those who are to opt for more avoidance (at more
expense) or the converse. (The obvious costs of all this in terms of individual
choice, even if we posit representative unions, need not be dwelt upon.)
Such an approach would immediately internalize to each HMO some cost of
'bad' medical care, and cause these to be reflected in the rates each HMO
would charge in contradistinction to 'safer' competitors. Without more,
however, the circle would not be rounded out. Specifically, the costs of
subsequent medical care as a result of either inadequate or too much treat-
ment would be internalized to the HMOS, and an incentive to treat initially so
as to reduce such subsequent costs appropriately would exist. But there
would be no incentive linked to the HMO to avoid treatment which, if it failed,
would produce an untreatable, but perhaps unemployed and unemploy-
able, victim.
Again, if individual consumers could know this risk, adequately, without
insurance, and therefore make it a part ofthe HMO negotiation, there would
be no problem. But this is no more than saying that, in theory, pure contract
law could cope with the problem ofadequate medical care - and were that so,
we would have ended this discussion long agoY No, to convert this un-
10 'HMOS' distinguishing characteristic is that Ihey undertake to provide all the medical care
their enrollees need in exchange for fixed, advance capitation payments.' Bovbjerg, The
medical malpractice standard ofcare: HMOS and customary practice, (1975) Duke LJ. 1376.
The same anicle, at 1375-414 contains a careful description of HMOS and of how malprac-
tice law would affect and be affected by them.
11 See supra text and note 2. To the extent that HMOS, by working in an employment context,
generate greater knowledge of such risks than would otherwise be available to individual
patients, then, as Frech (in a discussion of this anicle to be published by the American
Enterprise Institute as pan of the collection of papers on the Economics of Medical
Malpractice mentioned in note 1, supra) points out, some of the impediments to a pure
contractual solution would be removed. One may well doubt, however, that the union-
employer-HMo nexus will, without specific incentives, do an adequate job of internalizing
the costs of those injuries which would make a patient, unemployable and untreatable: that
is, injuries which make the patient not only no longer a charge on the HMO, but possibly no
longer the responsibility of either the employer or the union.
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employment risk into a statistical figure which could be meaningfully assimi-
lated in the HMo-employment contract some sort of wage maintenance
insurance would be required. And, since it would be hard to define when
wage maintenance was needed because of treatment and non-treatment
errors and when it was needed for non-medical reasons, the most likely form
such insurance would take would be universal wage maintenance. (The
'moral hazard' costs involved in such an approach should be readily appar-
ent.) With such insurance, any given employer-union combination, in any
given industry, could readily compare the cost of competing HMOS not only
in terms of their present and future treatment costs, but also in terms of their
'absenteeism' costs.
The circle would still not be complete, however. The HMO which either
cured or killed could underbid the HMO which preserved life at a higher
present or future medical and absenteeism cost. The same would be true for
the HMO which reduced safety and accident costs by increasing chances of
pain which could not be alleviated by treatment and which did not bring on
absenteeism. The second is perhaps too fanciful to be worried about. The
first may well not be. In order to deal with the first, we would have to require
that life insurance for a substantial amount be made part of the union-
employer package, along with wage maintenance and insurance against
future medical care needs. Then the circle would be complete, the buyer
would know that virtually all treatment and non-treatment costs were
reflected in the price of any HMO, and that, therefore, incentives to reduce
such costs, appropriately, would lie on the HMO and its employees, the
doctors.
Reduction in HMO price by reducing amenities of care would, of course,
remain possible, as would increased comfort, at increased price. But as to
these, I readily admit, I become a pure contractarian. I think the consumer
has adequate knowledge to decide whether standing in line is worth what it
saves, and having an HMO which permits relatives, comfortably and easily, to
visit the hospitalized patient is worth what it costs. As a result, such compari-
son among competing HMOS would not, in my view, require any intervention
to maximize satisfaction. I hope so, for, if I am right, the long and rather
tedious discussion between doctors and sociologists of what constitutes
adequate medical care, and of whether it includes comfortable waiting
rooms and bedside manners, can be shortcircuited. And, more important,
rounding out the circle, it should be clear, would be exceedingly costly even
without further intervention designed to deal with these problems.
It may be worthwhile spending a moment considering why it is so complex
and costly. That may best be done by thinking about what it is that we have
done when we completed the circle. We have, in effect, made any death
which occurs sooner than the appropriate life expectancy for individuals in
that industry a part of the medical care cost. We have also made any
absenteeism, whether treatable or not, part of the same cost. And, ofcourse,
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we began by making subsequent medical care part of the cost as well. And
finally, we made the costs of avoiding all of these costs part of medical care
costs. To the extent that an HMO does an average job on any of these counts
(as presumably would be the case if death or absenteeism were genuinely
unrelated to treatment or non-treatment), the HMO and its competitors
would be affected equally. A superior or inferior job, however seemingly
unrelated to medicine, would instead pe reflected in the competing HMOS'
costs. Financial incentives would now be present because any medical maloc-
currence and any costs ofavoiding that maloccurrence would now be part of
the scheme and compensable. But, to create the scheme, all sorts of non-
medical costs were included in it and made subject to compulsory insurance.
Since insurance is, obviously, not cost free - administratively, in terms of
incentives to avoid harms, and in terms of permitting individuals the option
to choose risks rather than coverage and spend the money saved elsewhere-
the well-rounded circle comes anything but cheap.
If, however, one believes that, except for extreme cases of butchery,
anything short of a complete circle of incentives is worse than no incentives,
what are we to do? The fault approach, by trying to concentrate on those
treatments and non-treatments which, ex post, we could say were worth
avoiding ex ante, was one solution. It is plausible; unfortunately, if its object
was efficiency in medical care, it has failed. We could try a Havighurst-
Tancredi (Medical Adversity Insurance) approach, but it doesn't, ultimately,
promise enough of an answer. We could go to regulation, and in my judg-
ment either create a system which does nothing (but may give people at large
the feeling that something is being done, until they wake up and realize they
have been fooled), or, worse, create a system which applies real standards
that will quickly go out of date and lead to poor medical care. Finally, we
could give up on any incentives to good medical care, except in the extreme
cases, and concentrate solely on spreading and wealth-distribution goals.
This would entail the abolition of malpractice law, the establishment of
medical catastrophe insurance, and the creation of peer or criminal law
bodies to punish the occasional scoundrel.
I have been told that this last approach would prove unacceptable to the
mass of people, especially as medical care plans become more universal. In
such circumstances people demand the appearance of controls, even if
ineffective and costly. And certainly, our tendency to look for scapegoats or
for what appear to be solutions, even when they don't exist, in other areas of
law supports this cynical view. Perhaps the old, old, rarely successful mal-
practice suit, ineffective both as a source of incentives and mis-incentives, as
it was, served this very function of creating a useful illusion of control where
no control was feasible. In the United States, it is, nonetheless, dead and
cannot be resurrected. Old subterfuges, once exposed, can almost never
regain credibility. One may wonder whether, had non-fault compensation
for medical catastrophes been established and paid for out of the general
HeinOnline -- 27 U. Toronto L.J. 141 1977
THE PROBLEM OF MALPRACTICE 141
fisc, we would have felt pressure to enlarge, and ultimately to expose as a
sham incentive system, the liability of doctors for malpractice. But whatever
one may think about that question, the option it represented is probably no
longer open to us in the United States. Whether it is still open to Canada, I do
not know, but given the United States' proximity, it seems hardly likely.12
As a result, we are faced with an uncomfortable problem. We can try to
round out the circle of incentives, all the while being deeply uncertain as to
whether such schemes will be worth their costs. We can openly abandon
incentives in this area (except for those that either pure contract or regula-
tion can give at the extremes) and concentrate on spreading and redistribut-
ing some medical burdens, knowing all the while that perhaps a more
sophisticated incentive scheme might have been worth it. We can try to
control by regulation what in easier areas has proved very hard to regulate
intelligently. Or, finally, we can create new subterfuges, less adequate than
the old precisely because chosen rather than found, which only give the
semblance of assuring 'quality' medical care while freeing us to spend or
redistribute to the extent we wish. I, it should be obvious, would opt for
either of the first two. I strongly suspect, however, that both will be rejected
in favour of regulation or subterfuge, or most likely a mixture of regulation
and subterfuge like the American PSROS.
12 One may usefully compare England where, in a legal environment which early promoted
compensation, malpractice law has seemed quite capable of withstanding pressures to
expand liability.
